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the choices that states make in this regard. We compare return policies to 
other economic policies geared to emigrants. This allows detecting of return 
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The recent ‘remittance euphoria’ is not justified, because unattractive 
investment environments and restrictive immigration policies which in-
terrupt circular migration patterns prevent the high development potential 
of migration from being fully realized. 
(Haas 2005)
Introduction
The return to and reinsertion of migrants in their countries of origin has 
become a priority on the agendas of international and regional migration 
policy conferences. After all, return is a necessary condition for circular and 
temporary migration, which have been the most favored kind of cross-border 
migration policy schemes in recent decades. As such, it is among the first 
issues negotiated between states trying to manage migration flows bilater-
ally or multilaterally (Agunias & Newland, 2007). In addition to return, 
remittance sending is another aspect of the relationship between migrants 
and their places of origin that has captured the attention of scholars, policy-
makers, international organizations, and international cooperation agencies. 
For instance, two key institutions in the United Nations system, the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International Organiza-
tion for Migration (IOM), have long counted both remittances and return 
as central strategies in the link between migration and development – a 
link that has given great impetus to the study of migration worldwide over 
the last two decades. In its mandate, the IOM states that one of its goals is: 
the fulfilment of initiatives that mobilize the financial resources 
and competencies of […] expatriate communities to invest and 
participate in the development of their […] [home communi-
ties], in as much as possible, and in close collaboration with 
the receiving countries; support for national processes of de-
velopment or rehabilitation and reconstruction of developing 
countries, whose economies are in transition or emerging from 
situations of conflict, through the return and socioeconomic 
reintegration of competent and qualified nationals who are cur-
rently living abroad; and the implementation of policies and 
development mechanisms that promote migrant remittance 
transfer services, thus increasing the effects of these on develop-
ment.1 (IOM 2019) 
1 Translation by Apuntes.
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Notwithstanding this “blessing” by international organizations, there 
is a lively and broad debate among practitioners, scholars, and migrant 
associations about the desirability and fairness of such policies from indi-
vidual, democratic, human rights, and global justice perspectives. For var-
ious political reasons, states may favor different kinds of economic policies 
to connect to their diasporas. The implications of these policy options 
suddenly become palpable if we think about the predatory practices of 
the contemporary Eritrean government in chasing down its emigrants in 
order to extract taxes to sustain its autocratic regime (Hirt & Mohammad, 
2017). But it is not just such extreme cases that are of interest to us. As 
we will show here, there are intense scholarly and political debates in fairly 
well-functioning democracies about how appropriate it is for the state to 
use remittances for development. Some remittance and diaspora experts 
seriously question the state’s drawing upon privately earned resources for 
such public purposes, from the point of view of both efficiency and ethics. 
In this paper, we investigate how 22 Latin American and Caribbean states 
(representing almost the entire LAC region) approach economic policies 
concerning emigrants, placing special attention on the way they combine 
policies aimed at fostering investment or return, in contrast to the most 
common and most studied economic policy deployed by states towards 
their emigrants: the facilitation of remittances. We demonstrate that there 
is considerable variation in economic policies concerning emigrants within 
this sample of countries. 
1. The return of emigrants or the return of their earnings?
There is a common assumption in migration studies that emigrants are 
not typically the poorest members of a society, since they at least have the 
resources to migrate. Other commonly held beliefs are that most emigrants 
are in their most productive stages of their lives, or about to enter these 
stages, and that emigrants are often among the most entrepreneurial and 
courageous of their cohorts. If these statements are true, then emigration 
presupposes a serious loss of resources for the country of origin, especially 
if it has invested significantly in the population that leaves and/or where 
negative migration flows constitute a sustained demographic trend over time. 
Brain drain will ensue unless states develop an approach that arranges for 
some corresponding gains from individual emigration of professionals (as 
is the case with some professional emigrants from Cuba, for example), or 
develop emigration policies linked to particular development approaches (as 
in the Philippines). More commonly, though, states of origin try to mitigate 
the adverse effects of the loss of people not through direct regulation of 
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emigration but by developing emigrant policies; that is, by designing poli-
cies that target people who already reside abroad2. Often, emigrant policies 
seek to promote the establishment of ties between the state of origin and 
its diaspora in order to encourage emigrants to make economic decisions 
that will benefit the home country, whether by providing incentives to send 
remittances, by offsetting “brain drain” with compensation schemes, or by 
creating incentives for the return of emigrants.
States of origin that seek to foster economic ties with their non-resident 
citizens have a wide repertoire of policies options to choose from (Pedroza 
& Palop-García, 2017; Gamlen, 2006). They may promote and facilitate 
the transfer of remittances by establishing special banking channels to evade 
the high fees that cash-to-cash companies usually charge, or by directly 
controlling the fees that money transfer agencies may charge. They can 
create a transfer system that is quick, reliable, and easy for migrants and 
their families back home to manage. But they may instead look to foster 
something more than remittances, for example, by implementing policies 
that provide incentives for emigrant investments or co-investment schemes 
(e.g. different levels of government in the home country encourage emigrants 
to donate money for infrastructure or community development projects 
in their local communities, while government counterparts contribute an 
equal or greater amount). 
Of all these policies, it is the schemes directed at sending and using 
remittances for co-development schemes (such as the “3x1” in Mexico) 
that have attracted the most attention in the literature. There is a vast lit-
erature on the use of remittances by households, as well as their effects on 
development, political behavior, and social and gender relations. Together, 
these studies provide an inconclusive picture regarding the desirability of 
policies that aim to encourage remittances. On the positive side, remittances 
can reduce poverty (Adams Jr. & Page, 2005); elevate the social status of 
households that include emigrants, furnishing them with basic nutrition 
and education to break cycles of poverty and political dependence; provide 
financial security and allow households with emigrants to invest more than 
those with no migrants; and create a multiplier effect locally, thereby stim-
2 Emigrant policies are also referred to as “diaspora engagement policies.” Together with immigrant 
(integration) policies, they are one of the two subsets of migration policies; the other is emigra-
tion/immigration policies. In contrast to immigration/emigration policies, which regulate entry 
and exits (flows), immigrant or emigrant policies regulate the rights and obligations of migrants 
already resident in a receiving country or absent from their country of origin. This is part of the 
conceptualization we have developed in our current research project "Every Immigrant is an Emi-
grant
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ulating economic activity and leading in turn to higher employment and 
investment (Durand, Parrado, & Massey, 1996; Terry, 2005). Moreover, 
migrant remittances are an important pillar of the economies of sending 
countries, sometimes exceeding other sources of capital such as foreign 
direct investment or bank lending. They also tend to be resilient to crises 
(Joseph et al., 2010) and even move in a countercyclical manner relative 
to the country of origin’s economy, serving as an international risk-sharing 
mechanism for developing countries (Singer, 2010). However, the effects of 
remittances on gender and parental relations, inequality in the local context, 
and broader sustainable development have been a matter of debate. Studies 
have shown their effect in these areas to be modest at best, or even negative 
in the short term (Taylor, 1992; Olivié, Ponce, & Onofa, 2008). More and 
more questions are being asked about the extent to which remittances can 
be trusted as a means of fostering development (Kapur, 2004). 
In an effort to multiply the effects of remittances beyond the consump-
tion of receiving families, several states of origin have devised programs to 
stimulate the transfer of remittances specifically for investment purposes. 
Paramount among these are co-development programs that tap into emi-
grants’ donations for community development projects in their places of 
origin. In these schemes, emigrants from the same places of origin organize 
through hometown associations and make donations for infrastructure proj-
ects at home. At times, these can amount to as much as seven times the local 
government budgets for public works (Orozco, 2012) and do in fact lead to 
improvements looked for the basic utilities in local communities of origin 
(Adida & Girod, 2011). Mexico has been a forerunner of such economic 
policies, which initiated when local governments cooperated with hometown 
associations of Mexicans in the U.S. (Soto Priante & Velázquez Holguín, 
2006). For the most part, the literature on economic policies regarding 
diasporas has been dominated by perspectives – theories, assumptions and 
hypotheses, but also data and methods – that are well-rooted in economics 
and political economy. Although we find the conversation on the drivers 
and effects of remittances very interesting to follow, in this article we adopt a 
different approach that we hope will contribute to expanding and enriching 
perspectives on the full extent of the economic policies employed by states 
to strengthen their links with their emigrants, beyond remittances.
There is a need for a broader perspective on the economic policies devised 
by states of origin for their emigrants, because, among other reasons, the 
policy tide has slowly turned against the “development mantra” of remittances 
given the many methodological caveats that must be taken into account 
before remittances can be considered as a strategy for poverty reduction, devel-
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opment or community well-being (Fajnzylber & López, 2008), not to speak 
of the socioeconomic and political disruptions that tend to go ignored in 
the more optimistic literature on remittances (Márquez, Covarrubias 2006). 
In the last 15 years, more and more actors, such as the Inter-American 
Dialogue’s Task Force on Remittances, have cautioned that any construc-
tive policy intervention aiming to “capture” remittances for development 
purposes should first acknowledge the “private nature of these flows” (New-
land, 2004, 28-30). In the Latin American and Caribbean region, by way 
of the Brasilia Declaration of 2011, South American countries (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suri-
name, Uruguay, and Venezuela) pledged to avoid co-investment programs 
that tap into remittances (Red Internacional de Migración y Desarrollo, 
2011), deeming these a private resource for individuals and families that 
should not be used by the state. This marked a clear divergence from the 
co-development programs of the innovator in the field: Mexico. 
However, Mexico is a relative latecomer in Latin America when it comes 
to another aspect of economic emigrant policies: return. Mexico has only 
recently started to create programs for its returnees, even though their num-
bers had already reached the hundreds of thousands in the last decade. Few 
studies deal with the policies of the Mexican state towards returnees, and 
those that do exist are in the fields of demography, sociology, and mostly 
economics (Corona-Jiménez & Corona-Jiménez, 2018; Rivera Sánchez, 
2013, 2015). This reveals the inertia of a literature centered on remittances 
from economic perspectives. Beyond Mexico, the issue is relevant for coun-
tries with different diasporic profiles: how do countries of origin conceive 
of economic policies for emigrants in countries less reliant on them as a 
source of foreign exchange? The present study contributes to correcting this 
problem by comparing state strategies aimed at increasing remittances with 
those aimed at fostering return.
The right to return is a principle linked to citizenship, as well as a goal 
that migrants across the world hold dear. From the perspective of the state 
of origin, the facilitation of return has been key to strategies of rehabilitation 
and reconciliation by regimes transitioning to democracy – especially in 
cases in which migrants emigrated for political reasons (as exiles) or were 
expelled by acute crises. Thus, return is a legal right, a legitimate individual 
strategy, as well as a political project. More than that, and as Cassarino (2004) 
rightly notes, return is a “multifaceted and heterogeneous phenomenon.” 
However, in this paper we would like to consider to what extent states may 
also consider return as an economic strategy. Certainly, migrants returning 
to apply/share their know-how and resources with others can be projected 
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as a policy for the economic advantage of the states of origin, and one with 
the potential to change the socio-economic fabric of these places of origin. 
This is the promise of bilateral schemes by which receiving states cooperate 
with states of origin to cooperate in adapting migration to the (apparent) 
needs and advantages of all parties concerned, as exemplified by the Euro-
pean Commission’s (EC) Global Approach to Migration, which supports 
the exploration of “diaspora investment vehicles” (European Commission 
2005, 2011). This is also why circular or temporary migration – that is, 
migration with a view of returning to the place of origin – is the preferred 
strategy of “well-managed migration” agencies and “migration governance” 
arrangements, as exemplified by the mobility partnerships between the EU 
and countries such as Armenia, Cape Verde, or Senegal (Sinatti, 2014, 5). 
In order for return to have productive effects, states of origin cannot 
remain idle; they must act in certain ways to create an environment for 
return in which social and occupational reinsertion can provide the benefits 
they promise for returnees and their societies of origin. The challenges begin 
with the decision to return itself (in cases where the return is voluntary, that 
is); many states of origin invest in trying to convince their emigrants into 
deciding to return. Instead of coaxing emigrants into physically returning, 
many states prefer to tap into their skills through so called “brain-circulation” 
programs that call for the return of skills rather than people.
Return policies come display different main differences: they can be 
universal or selective, and unfortunately, most states have return policies 
that fall into the latter category. For instance, in the case of Argentina, the 
only communication campaigns aimed at convincing emigrants to return are 
so-called “brain gain” policies, suggesting that the emigrants whom the state 
wants back – those missed the most – are young, internationally educated, 
and highly qualified. Indeed, the Organization of Ibero-American States 
regards the repatriation of scientists as “Argentine state policy.” However, 
the existence of a general policy to assist in the decision to return may be 
considered a key component of a broad policy of voluntary return. Usually, 
a general policy of return consists at the very least in making it easy for 
emigrants to return by exempting their belongings from import taxes. More-
over, general policies for the recognition of qualifications obtained abroad, 
based on a clear and expedited process, are a key condition for successful 
reinsertion into the educational system, labor market, and entrepreneurial 
activities. Meanwhile, schemes such as job placement programs allow return-
ing migrants to quickly apply skills through economic activities. However, a 
suitable environment for receiving returnees is important for voluntary and 
involuntary returnees alike. There is an undeniable psychological dimension 
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to return that cannot be underestimated: the success of return programs 
depends not only on reforms in the home market to reintegrate migrants, 
but also on the social or cultural psychology of the emigrant community 
(Dawson, 2007, 10). Are workers welcome to come home after they retire? 
Is return perceived as failure? A large part of this psychosocial dimension 
is shaped by policies. Countries that focus on incentivizing return through 
exclusively campaigns directed at all emigrants (as opposed to programs 
directed at those who are highly skilled, entrepreneurial, or members of 
certain professions) help to rehabilitate emigrants as potential returnees in 
the eyes of the non-mobile population – an important symbolic measure 
that facilitates reinsertion into the society of origin.
Now, if some states reject policies fostering remittances on the basis that 
they are a private resource that should not be tapped into by the state, we 
cannot help but ask whether there is a trade-off in the economic strategies 
of states of origin, with states prioritizing either remittances or return. 
Our research is based on publically available data provided by the 
EMIX project, which collected cross-sectional data on the policies of 22 
Latin American and Caribbean countries (henceforth LAC) for 2015. Our 
research question is: what economic strategies are chosen by LAC states of 
origin in terms of policies targeting their emigrant communities? Is there a 
trade-off between policies intended to attract remittances/investments and 
policies to foster return? 
As our exploratory analysis will show, there is a widespread general dis-
position on the part of Latin American countries of origin towards mobility, 
which is manifested in the establishment of legal and labor conditions to 
attract migrants back. Our study challenges the prevailing notion in the 
literature that the main motive for government emigrant policies is to tap 
into the resources of migrants (Gamlen et al., 2013; Gamlen, 2006, 10). 
In the case of the LAC states, general emigrant policies are not developed 
with the ultimate intention of capturing remittances, despite the undeniable 
importance of these transfers for many economies in the region. Remittances 
are only one part of the story of formulating emigrant policies (Délano & 
Gamlen, 2014, 44). In addition, our study reveals that different strategies 
lay behind return policies: in some countries, the focus is on the return of 
migrants with certain skills that are seen as strategically important; elsewhere, 
there are more general schemes that incentivize return for all emigrants. The 
different economic strategies chosen by states of origin materialize in differ-
ent policy combinations, which likely correspond to different aims and even 
to different philosophies and approaches to migration and development.
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2. Data & Definitions
Policies to encourage remittances and, to a greater extent, return programs 
usually have different constellations of actors, including international orga-
nizations (IOM, EU), NGOs, receiving states, and states of origin. Here we 
focus solely on the policies of states of origin and on those that foster the 
most classic remittances – personal transfers and capital transfers between 
households – even though the IMF and World Bank have recently taken 
into account employee compensations and social benefits (World Bank 
Data Help Desk, 2018; Statistical Office of the European Communities 
and International Monetary Fund, 2009). 
The distinction between voluntary and forced return is not always clear, 
which is why some researchers use the term “decided return” (Cassarino, 
2008). For our purposes, this distinction is not of great importance because 
we focus on policies related to the return (or not) of migrants. Thus, volition 
is only relevant if it affects the decision of the state of origin to target one 
type of returnee and not others. But since this is rarely the case, at least 
explicitly, we are more interested in demonstrating when return programs 
are selective in relation to skills or formal qualification levels. What really 
matters for the purposes of our study is whether the circumstances of 
return (voluntary or not) are important in activating support mechanisms 
for returning migrants. We find that return policies do vary in terms of the 
recipients targeted (based on skill level) and the type of involvement that 
authorities in the state of origin have in the repatriation process. This sug-
gests that the type of return does matter, since some return policies apply 
to anyone regardless of how they returned, while others are clearly aimed at 
voluntary and self-determined return. This is why we follow Parella Rubio, 
Petroff and Serradell Pumareda’s definition of policies for voluntary return 
(2014, 174) as those measures aimed at assisting the decision to return (be 
it temporary or definitive) and at facilitating the preparation of the return 
and the subsequent adaptation (logistically, psychologically, financially, or 
materially) of individuals coming back to their state of origin. 
In this analysis, we use data provided by the EMIX-GIGA dataset.3 This 
dataset contains information about emigrant policies adopted by 22 Latin 
American states, including economic and return policies. EMIX-GIGA 
only provides information on the existence of the policy programs – that 
3 This dataset was published in 2017 and is fully available at the GESIS data repository. The dataset 
was developed by researchers of the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies (Ham-
burg, Germany) and includes information on emigrant policies adopted by 22 states in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
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is, policy outputs rather than implementation.4 Moreover, the dataset only 
covers policies in place in 2015. The indicators that we use are split into 
two groups: those that refer to programs that foster or ease remittances and 
investments; and those that describe the return schemes adopted by the 
countries of origin (if any). The following indicators are included in the first 
group: improvements to banking channels used to send remittances; controls 
on remittance fees; programs for the use of remittances in co-development; 
and investment schemes tailored for emigrants. The indicators in the second 
group are: recognition of academic/professional qualifications obtained 
abroad and the timeframe for the process (basic signal of the readiness 
of the state to facilitate reinsertion); communication campaigns aimed at 
convincing emigrants to return (of symbolic importance); tax exemptions 
on bringing household goods into the country of origin (a common but 
minimal policy); and programs to facilitate the integration of returnees in 
their home societies.
Table 1 
Summary of economic emigrant policies included in the analysis
Dimension Program
Remittances and investment Improvement of banking channels used to send remittances
Controls on remittance fees 
Programs to use remittances for co-development 
Investment schemes tailored for emigrants
Return Recognition of academic/professional qualifications obtained 
abroad
Communication campaigns aimed at convincing emigrants to 
return (of symbolic importance)
Tax exemptions to bring household goods into the country of 
origin (common policy, but minimal)
Programs to facilitate the re-integration of returnees in their home 
societies
Source: compiled by authors based on GIGA-EMIX.
4 For studies about implementation, see (Schramm, 2011; Parella, Petroff, &, Serradell, 2013). For 
a longer treatment of the differences between policy output, policy implementation, and policy 
outcomes (i.e. the results of both implementation and other factors affecting the target population 
simultaneously) and the importance of clarifying the researchers’ focus when analyzing any policy 
related to migration, see (Helbling et al., 2013).
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3. Analysis
a. Policies focused on remittances and investment
Table 2 shows the economic policies that LAC countries have adopted 
to foster remittances or investment. On the aggregate level, the develop-
ment of investment schemes for emigrants in the states of origin and the 
improvement of banking channels for remittances are the two policies most 
broadly adopted, while controls on remittance fees and state-led programs 
to foster co-development through remittances only exist in two countries: 
Mexico and Guatemala. In turn, it is remarkable that some countries, such 
as Ecuador, have large emigrant populations and high levels of remittances, 
but no policies to facilitate them. 
Furthermore, it seems apparent that there is no clear pattern of adop-
tion of these policies across the countries in our sample. Only one country, 
Mexico, has adopted all four of the policies included in our analysis, while 
the others have different combinations in place.
For instance, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador have only devel-
oped investment schemes for emigrants and reinforced banking channels 
for sending remittances; Argentina and Cuba have only improved their 
banking channels for remittances; and Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru only 
offer investment schemes to their emigrants. Finally, another group of coun-
tries, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, 
Panama, and Venezuela, have no such policies in place.
Table 2 
Policies focused on remittances and investment
Country Investment
Schemes
Remittances for
co-
development
Controls on 
remittance fees
Improvement 
remittance
channels
Argentina No No No Yes
Belize No No No No
Bolivia No No No No
Brazil Yes No No Yes
Chile Yes No No Yes
Colombia Yes No No No
Costa Rica No No No No
Cuba No No No Yes
Dominican Republic No No No No
Ecuador No No No No
El Salvador Yes No No Yes
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Guatemala No Yes No No
Honduras Yes No No No
Jamaica Yes No No Yes
Mexico Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nicaragua No No No No
Panama No No No No
Paraguay Yes No No No
Peru Yes No No No
Trinidad and Tobago No No No No
Uruguay Yes No No Yes
Venezuela No No No No
Source: compiled by authors based on EMIX-GIGA.
A detailed analysis of EMIX data shows that programs to attract remit-
tances are quite diverse.5 For instance, Argentina, a country that receives 
relatively few remittances,6 has a program called Cuenta Provincia Ahorro 
25 that allows non-resident Argentines to open a joint bank account at 
the Banco Provincia de Buenos Aires with relatives living in Argentina. In 
Brazil, the Caixa Econômica Federal – a bank connected to the Ministry 
of Finance – offers a remittance program, Remessas Internacionais, as does 
the country’s largest public bank, Banco do Brasil, through its program BB 
Remessa. Additionally, the Central Bank of Brazil published an information 
brochure targeting citizens abroad interested in performing financial trans-
actions (low value remittances).7
As for investment, there are a wide variety of schemes. Some target the 
acquisition of real estate by emigrants. The Mi casa con Remesas program, 
managed by the Inter-American Development Bank, COMFAMA, along-
side several Colombian cajas de compensación, allows families to pay their 
mortgages with the remittances they receive from their relatives living 
abroad. All Colombians that receive remittances on a regular basis can 
apply to the program. Both the receivers and senders of remittances will be 
owners of the property purchased. In addition to a similar program for home 
ownership, Mexico also has the Paisano invierte en tu tierra program, whose 
5 The examples provided in this article are from 2015. 
6 Jorge Martínez, América Latina y el Caribe: Migración Internacional, Derechos Humanos y Desar-
rollo, Libros de La CEPAL 97 (Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, 2008), 211.
7 In 2009, Brazil was the second biggest recipient of remittances in Latin America (behind Mexico), 
with USD 5 billion per year; however, this represents less than 1% of the national GDP, demon-
strating that such funds are comparatively less important for Brazil than for other nations in the 
region.
153
Return or Remittances? Diaspora Economic Policies of Latin American and Caribbean States
purpose is to connect remittances with rural and agricultural development. 
Targeted at individuals who want to start businesses using remittances, 
it grants loans to emigrants to allow them to invest in Mexico, provided 
they have a co-investor/co-signer in the country. The project aims to turn 
emigrants into prominent actors in the development and capitalization 
of the Mexican countryside. It specifically creates conditions for remit-
tance-receivers to reduce their economic dependence and for senders to 
become production partners. The projects funded can involve agribusiness, 
agro-tourism, organic certification, and greenhouses.
b. Policies focused on return
Table 3 summarizes the return policies adopted by the states included in 
our sample. There are several noteworthy findings. First, as Table 3 shows, 
the most common policy consists of a process for the recognition of qual-
ifications acquired elsewhere. The only countries without such a policy in 
place are Belize and Cuba; all the others recognize qualifications obtained 
abroad. Meanwhile, all countries in our sample, except Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, and Venezuela, give returnees tax 
exemptions to bring household goods back with them.
Second, only Ecuador has conducted communication campaigns abroad 
to foster the return of its emigrants. One such example is “Ecuador saludable, 
vuelvo por ti,” a campaign designed to persuade Ecuadorians working in the 
field of healthcare abroad to come back to Ecuador and work in the public 
healthcare system. All in all, Ecuador is the only country that has adopted 
all the policies that we include under return. 
Additionally, we observe that the rest of the policies listed in Table 
3 (brain-gain circulation, brain-gain strategies, integration programs for 
returnees, and tax exemptions for bringing personal and professional 
belongings into the country) are relatively common in the LAC region. 
For instance, 12 countries have brain-circulation networks. Argentina, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay have pioneered the development of poli-
cies that foster the transmission of knowledge to institutions in the state of 
origin. These brain-circulation programs have different features in different 
countries. In Argentina, for instance, under the program R@íces (Red de 
Argentinos Investigadores y Científicos en el Exterior), the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Productive Innovation (MINCyT) has created a network 
that aims to enhance relations between resident and non-resident Argen-
tine researchers. Jamaica has developed a brain-circulation network called 
The Diaspora Youth Connect Project that focuses not only on researchers 
and scientists, but more generally on qualified youth living abroad who 
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are considered to have human and financial resources that are potentially 
helpful to the country. 
Several countries have left brain-circulation programs for emigrants 
themselves to organize, relying on their capacities, interests, and leadership 
within a network structure. These structures are generally open not only to 
highly qualified emigrants, but also to successful entrepreneurs and million-
aires. Chile Global, El Salvador Global, and Honduras Global are examples 
of such networks, which are often based on governance structures – as 
opposed to government structures – that include private actors and NGOs 
(public-private partnerships). The Red de Mexicanos Altamente Calificados 
en el Extranjero (formerly Red de Talentos Mexicanos en el Extranjero) is a 
network mostly led in the U.S. by Mexican entrepreneurs, and in Europe 
by scientists and academics. It relies more on government structures and 
follows state guidelines for its program priorities.
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and 
Peru also have brain-gain programs defined as strategies to foster the return 
of emigrants to their states of origin, but these only target those who, because 
of their professional expertise or education, may count as a gain for these 
states. The targets of brain-gain strategies vary from country to country. In 
Ecuador, for instance, the PROMETEO program targets only Ecuadorian 
teachers and healthcare professionals abroad. In Argentina, the Reinserción 
de investigadores program developed by CONICET (Consejo Nacional de 
Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas) offers post-doctoral fellowships and 
arranges placements (in both the public and private sector) for Argentines 
who have studied abroad and want to return home to carry out research. 
Ten countries – Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Hondu-
ras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay – have programs to facilitate 
the reintegration of returnees into society. Reintegration policies vary greatly 
across countries in terms of resources allocated, targets, and level of insti-
tutionalization. Brazil, for instance, currently has a pilot project (Núcleo de 
Informação e Apoio a Trabalhadores Retornados do Exterior, NIATRE) focused 
solely on the reintegration into the labor market of returnees from Japan. 
In Colombia, the Law of Return, Law 1565 of 31 July 2012, regulates a 
program providing incentives to promote the return of Colombian emigrants 
from a multidimensional perspective, differentiating between four catego-
ries of return: 1) “solidarity return” (retorno solidario), reserved for victims 
of the armed conflict; 2) “humanitarian return,” (retorno humanitario) for 
Colombians facing threats to their physical safety; 3) ”occupational return” 
(retorno laboral), for Colombians intending to use their qualifications and 
experiences abroad in Colombia; and 4) “productive return,” (retorno pro-
155
Return or Remittances? Diaspora Economic Policies of Latin American and Caribbean States
ductivo) for Colombians intending to co-fund productive projects linked 
to the development of their department or municipality. 
Table 3 
Policies focused on return
Country Brain-
circulation
Brain-gain Re-integration 
program
Tax 
exemptions
Communication 
campaigns
Recognition 
of 
qualifications
Argentina Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Belize No No No Yes No No
Bolivia No No No Yes No Yes
Brazil Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Chile Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Colombia Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Costa Rica Yes No No No No Yes
Cuba No No No No No No
Dominican 
Republic
No No No Yes No Yes
Ecuador Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
El Salvador Yes No Yes No No Yes
Guatemala No No No Yes No Yes
Honduras Yes No Yes No No Yes
Jamaica Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Mexico Yes Yes No No No Yes
Nicaragua Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Panama No No No No No Yes
Paraguay No No Yes Yes No Yes
Peru No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Trinidad 
and Tobago
No No No Yes No Yes
Uruguay Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Venezuela No No No No No Yes
Source: compiled by authors based on GIGA-EMIX.
4. A trade-off between return and remittances?
A second question that this paper asks is whether or not the governments of 
LAC countries of origin develop their economic emigrant policies based on 
a trade-off between remittances/investment policies and policies that aim at 
fostering return; that is, whether they prefer to receive resources from their 
emigrants or have these emigrants return. Figure 1 helps us to answer this 
question with a visual summary of the policies implemented. If a country 
of origin has adopted a certain type of policy, the cell is colored orange: 
the darker the hue, the greater the number of programs in that particular 
area of economic policy. If the country has not adopted a policy, the cell 
is colored yellow. The figure paints a relatively simple picture: there is no 
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clear trade-off, but a combination of different programs that, if anything, 
show that return policies in the region have a broader focus than just on 
remittances and/or investment. 
A further comparative finding (which is easy to grasp thanks to this 
illustration) is that, on the one hand, there is a group of countries that 
have adopted almost none of the programs under study (Cuba, Costa Rica, 
Panama, Venezuela, Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, and Bolivia), 
and on the other hand, the remaining countries, which have very diverse 
strategies. For instance, Mexico stands out for being the only country 
clearly geared towards remittances and investment instead of return (at least 
until the year data was collected, 2014-2015), whereas Ecuador, Nicara-
gua, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, and Honduras stand out for having more 
elaborate return policies, but not full-fledged policies to foster remittances. 
These seven countries are the only ones to suggest that the hypothesized 
existence of a trade-off between both types of emigrant economic policies 
could have some traction. Finally, there is a group of countries composed of 
Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, and Honduras that have adopted programs in both 
policy realms. However, even in these countries there seems to be a greater 
concern for return than for remittances. Finally, it is worth mentioning 
that the two most common programs in the region are the recognition of 
foreign education degrees and tax exemptions on returnees’ belongings. 
157
Return or Remittances? Diaspora Economic Policies of Latin American and Caribbean States
Figure 3 
Return and remittances policies in Latin American and Caribbean countries
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Source: compiled by authors based on GIGA-EMIX. If a policy has been adopted, the cell is colored 
in dark orange; if not, the cell is colored yellow. Red suggests that several policies have been put in 
place to the same end.
5. Discussion, conclusion and further a for research
In this paper we propose that when dealing with the complex social envi-
ronment in which states of origin and their emigrants interact, it is helpful 
to investigate the extent to which these states develop economic policies 
to incentivize migrant remittances and/or return, and how they combine 
these policies. This is especially important when certain types of return 
and transfer are preferred over others. For example, it is important to note 
cases where policies to encourage highly qualified individuals to return are 
prioritized and more all-encompassing return policies are lacking.
Undoubtedly, for either remittances or return to become engines of 
sustainable growth, many policies would be needed in addition to those 
analyzed here, including those providing for secure legal frameworks, proper 
local and regional planning, and significant spending on infrastructure, 
sanitation, and health. All of these are structural preconditions for any of 
these policies to be effective – not to mention for securing basic respect for 
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the human rights and physical integrity of returnees, which is lacking in 
many countries, especially in Central America and Mexico. 
Our policy indicators are merely the most immediate and necessary 
ones to lead to any sort of development but to be effective they require 
being part of larger strategies, whether by encouraging investment and 
savings rather than consumption; progressing from community donations 
to profitable enterprises; easing integration into the labor market; or fos-
tering technological and scientific progress (see Goldring 2004; Gammage 
2006). Our analysis does provide a necessary foundation for more stylized 
comparative analyses of the types of economic policies pursued by states of 
origin towards their emigrants, and for relating them to demographic and 
economic variables associated with emigrants’ migration profiles. A possible 
avenue for further research would be to explore how economic policies for 
emigrants correlate with other variables; for instance, do economic policy 
schemes towards migrants correspond to patterns of emigration (age, skill 
composition)? Our analysis can also serve as background for the selection 
of cases for in-depth study to find out how these policy combinations have 
been developed. We demonstrate that there is good reason to expand the 
scope of analysis of the strategies that states of origin aim at their diasporas, 
beyond just remittances. 
Admittedly, the analysis provided here only scratches the surface of 
the dense landscape of the political economy of diaspora policies, and we 
invite other scholars to explore this density in greater depth by employing 
different research methods. More immediately, though, it is hoped that 
this analysis of a snapshot of different constellations of economic emigrant 
policies will contribute to the burgeoning literature on emigrant policies, 
making it possible for forthcoming studies to inquire into how states design 
emigrant policies to incentivize remittances. The evidence provided here is 
a starting point in tracing the rationales that different countries of origin 
may have pursued in developing policies towards emigrants (for instance, 
if the main motivation is to attract remittances, then we would expect the 
intermediary economic policies needed to effectively transfer and invest 
them – e.g. remittance fee controls or/and banking channels – to exist). 
By contrast, there may be states of origin that are severely limited in their 
capacity to offer the most basic respect for civil, social, and economic rights, 
and which for the moment focus on extracting the most resources from 
emigrants without being able to even facilitate conditions for transfers (as 
seems to be the case across Central America). Are states with economies 
highly dependent on remittances uninterested in fostering the return of the 
average emigrant because they will lose an important source of income for 
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their economies? In some more “hawkish” cases, there are states of origin 
that focus solely on the extraction of money and skills (e.g. remittances and 
the return of qualified professionals abroad), without offering paths for the 
return of most of their citizens (i.e. with policies that are universal). 
Reflecting on our findings, we hypothesize that emigrant policies might 
reflect wider philosophies of human or economic development in which, 
for instance, return is conceived more holistically as an option that must 
remain open and be backed by the recognition and portability of social 
and political rights. Indicators for these factors could be included in future 
studies. Related to these wider philosophies of mobility – an area in which 
contemporary Latin America has been an innovator – it would be interesting 
to explore what kind of migration strategies are facilitated by the existing 
economic policies of different states of origin: is the paradigm still one of 
definitive return, or are strategies of dynamic, cyclical/repeat migration 
taken into account and encouraged (see Orrego Rivera & Martínez Pizarro, 
2015)? For example, the recognition of degrees and qualifications provided 
in the “Protocolo de Integração Educativa e Reconhecimento de Certificados, 
Títulos e Estudos de Nível Fundamental e Médio Não-Técnico”8 (signed by all 
full MERCOSUR member countries and the two associate members, Chile 
and Bolivia) facilitates the recognition of primary and secondary education 
completed in the respective signatory country and helps to make mobility 
in the region a more attainable option for their citizens and their children. 
It is important to recognize that the different economic policies also reflect 
different approaches to transnational life. For example, when recognition 
of degrees is transparent, smooth and quick, migrants can plan their life 
paths more flexibly and with less state constraints between two or more 
places of residence. At the same time, different economic strategies and 
their combinations reflect different state approaches to emigration; for 
example, campaigns geared towards luring back emigrants also convey the 
message that a skills and qualifications drain or de-skilling processes, often 
forced by adaptation to different labor markets in other countries, must be 
prevented (or corrected).
Finally, we are fully aware that more in-depth study is required in order 
to understand the limitations and specific characteristics of the policies 
analyzed here. It is possible to further refine the analysis for each policy 
presented here with additional data available in the EMIX dataset to better 
understand, for instance, the general remittance infrastructure, the possibil-
8 Mercosur, Protocolo de Integración Educativa Y Reválida de Diplomas, Certificados, Títulos Y Recon-
ocimiento de Estudios de Nivel Medio Técnico, 1995, 199.
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ity of accessing the banking system, or the existence of training in financial 
literacy for emigrants. Yet no comparative approach can substitute for the 
depth and insights gained by case experts. We think that comparative and 
case approaches are most useful when employed in a complementary man-
ner. We hope that the broad overview provided here will open up debate 
about the existence of discernable trends, and, more generally, lead to the 
theoretical refinement of hypotheses – thus far based on slim empirical 
evidence – regarding the crucial role of economic policies in the motivation 
of states to engage with their emigrants. 
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